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Abstract
There are ample opportunities at both design and manufacturing phases to meddle in a many-core chip system, especially
its underlining communication fabric, known as the networks-on-chip (NoC), through the inclusion of malicious hardware
Trojans (HT). In this paper, we focus on studying two specific HT-assisted Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely the
sinkhole and blackhole attacks, that directly target the NoC of a many-core chip. As of the blackhole attacks, those
intermediate routers with inserted HTs can stop forwarding data packets/flits towards the packets’ destination; instead,
packets are either dropped from the network or diverted to some other malicious nodes. Sinkhole attacks, which exhibit
similar attack effects as blackhole attacks, can occur when the NoC supports adaptive routing. In this case, a malicious
node actively solicits packets from its neighbor nodes by pretending to have sufficient free buffer slots. Effects and
efficiencies of both sinkhole and blackhole DoS attacks are modeled and quantified in this paper, and a few factors that
influence attack effects are found to be critical. Through fine-tuning of these parameters, both attacks are shown to
cause more damages to the NoC, measured as over 30% increase in packet loss rate. Even with current detection and
defense methods in place, the packet loss rate is still remarkably high, suggesting the need of new and more effective
detection and defense methods against the enhanced blackhole and sinkhole attacks as described in the paper.
Keywords: networks-on-chip, hardware Trojan, denial-of-service attack
1. Introduction
Hardware Trojans (HT) can pose a serious threat to
many-core chips, as they might cause the chips to mal-
function, or leak sensitive information. HTs can be in-
serted by embedding a malicious circuit during the design
or manufacturing phase of a chip [1]. In the literature
[2, 3, 4], a few HT designs were proposed and they could be
used to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against the
networks-on-chip (NoC) component of a many-core chip,
and the HT-enabled DoS attacks can cause serious dam-
ages to NoC, including dropping of packets, jamming of
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certain network node(s), leaking sensitive information, or
modification of functionalities, etc. [1].
In this paper, we consider two HT-assisted Denial-of-
Service (DoS) attacks, namely sinkhole and blackhole at-
tacks targeting NoC in a many-core chip. Both attacks can
cause great damage to the chips and the users of the chips.
For a balckhole attack, it can cause chips to malfunction
and leak the sensitive information, while a sinkhole attack
can aggregate the traffic and intercept the packets. In ad-
dition, the two attacks are easy to be realized by an HT
that has extremely low area and power costs, and can be
hard to detect.
To enable a blackhole attack, HTs are inserted into
the routers such that packets are not forwarded to their in-
tended destination; instead, the packets are either dropped
out from the network or forwarded to other malicious nodes.
Suppose node 1 in the example shown in Fig. 1 has a packet
that needs to be sent to node 9, and the packet is routed
through a malicious node, node 6. Upon receiving the
packet, node 6 actually sends the packet to a malicious
node, node 5 in this example. Node 9, the intended re-
cipient of the packet, will not be able to receive a single
packet from node 1. It should be noted that as there is
only one malicious interceptor, and as so, there will be no
deadlock in the network caused by the attack.
Preprint submitted to Journal of System Architecture July 31, 2018
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Figure 1: An example illustrating a blackhole attack.
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Figure 2: An example illustrating a sinkhole attack.
From the example shown in Fig. 1, one can see that
in a blackhole attack, the malicious nodes passively drop
packets or reroute packets to unintended recipients. This
is quite different from a sinkhole attack, where a malicious
node actively solicits packets from its neighbor nodes by
pretending to have sufficient free input buffer slots with
adaptive routing. To illustrate this type of attack, let us
assume that node 1 in Fig. 2 needs to send a packet to
node 9. When a packet reaches node 2, it has to make a
decision regarding which of the two downstream routers,
nodes 3 and 5, shall be forwarded to. This decision is
largely determined by node 2’s knowledge about how many
input buffer slots that each of nodes 3 and 5 has. Node 5,
a malicious router in this example, has purposely notified
node 2 that it has more empty slots in its input buffer
than node 3. As a result, a packet passing through node 2
will more likely be routed to node 5 than to node 3. This
malicious node can then either drop any packet coming to
it or forward a packet to some other nodes for more harm.
Either way, node 9 will not be able to receive some or all
the packets that were designated to it.
Effects of the above described sinkhole and blackhole
DoS attacks depend on a number of factors, including the
number of HTs and their distributions in the NoC, traffic
characteristics of the applications, and a few system pa-
rameters. In this paper, we intend to study and model how
these factors and parameters can be explored to enhance
the effectiveness of attacks. We will also examine how well
the current detection and defense methods respond to the
enhanced blackhole and sinkhole attacks described in the
paper.
The contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we
propose the HT-assisted blackhole and sinkhole attacks
targeting NoC, which can be launched by an HT that is
found hard to be detected. Design of the HT is thus de-
scribed and the attack flow is presented. The stealthiness
of the HT is also analyzed and guaranteed. Second, we
explore the factors that correlate to the attack effects of
sinkhole and blackhole attacks. A method to maximize
the attack effects is presented, and correspondingly, an
HT insertion methodology is proposed for maximized at-
tack effects in different situations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 reviews the related works. Realization of black-
hole/sinkhole attacks is described in Section 3, followed by
a detailed study on various parameters that can contribute
to the attack effects in Section 4. Section 5 introduces the
detection and defense methods that can be employed to
thwart the sinkhole and blackhole DoS attacks. Section 6
reports the results and assesses the effectiveness of the two
DoS attacks with or without detection/defense employed.
Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
2.1. Hardware Trojans
There are many possible channels that can get an HT
into a chip. For instance, when a many-core chip design
house employs a foundry to manufacture the chip, a com-
promised staff member of the foundry can secretly insert
HTs to the chip layout before it is fabricated. Once the
infected chips after manufacturing gets to end users’ sys-
tems, a hacker can gain the access to the chip by activating
the HTs in the chip. Designing and defending against HTs
in a chip has been a hot research topic [2, 3, 4, 1, 5, 6].
Various HTs and countermeasures have been proposed [2,
7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]. A typical HT is made of the trigger, the
Trojan circuit and the payload [1]. Hiding in the many-
core chips, HTs often hibernate most of the time and wake
up for specific signals or events [13]. Once a specific signal
or an event is present, the trigger of an HT first activates,
and then the payload circuit launches the attack. Such
operational model makes an HT difficult to be detected
during the design phase through computer simulations or
by off-line testing without explicit knowledge of the spe-
cific signals or events that trigger the attacks [14]. Hard-
ware Trojans may engage in different actions, including
modifying the functionality or specification of the hard-
ware, leaking sensitive information, or launching denial of
service attacks [3, 13, 15, 16].
HTs can be categorized into combinational Trojans and
sequential Trojans according to their triggering methods
[5]. A combinational Trojan is activated by a set of spe-
cific signals, while a sequential Trojan requires a sequence
2
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of specific events to trigger its payload. Based on the
triggering condition, hardware Trojans can then be clas-
sified as logic-based, sensor-based and always-on Trojans
[6]. In a logic-based Trojan, a specific binary pattern, say
00110101, in the payload of a data packet is reserved to
activate the Trojan. A sensor-based Trojan, on the other
hand, will be fired up by reaching certain temperature and
power levels as determined by the on-chip sensors. An
always-on Trojan, as its name suggests, is up running all
the time, and it does not need a trigger.
Current countermeasures against HT attacks can be
classified into three categories: HT prevention, HT detec-
tion and HT defense [1].
HT prevention is a practice that takes place during the
chip design stage to prevent the insertion of HTs in the
first place [17, 18].
HT detection relies on various approaches to determine
the existence of HTs, and locate them if they do exist. In
[19], a sustained vector methodology, where vectors are
repeated multiple times at the inputs of both the gen-
uine and the Trojan circuits, was proposed to help detect
a Trojan that hides in a chip. Another study provided
a proof-of-concept demonstration of the potential benefit
of using logical implications for the detection of combi-
national hardware Trojans [20]. In [21], the authors con-
cerned on the hardware Trojan detection in the network
interfaces of networks-on-chip using the state obfuscation.
HT defense is a process that wipes out the HTs entirely,
or at least, reduces the attack effects of the HTs. In [22], a
method that attempts to detect the presence of Trojans by
continuous monitoring and testing of the chip; if a core is
found infected with an HT, this infected core will no longer
be used and all its computing tasks will be switched over
to some other core(s). Another method, path security (P-
Sec) validation technique, was proposed to protect com-
promised networks-on-chip architectures from fault injec-
tion side channel attacks [23]. Traffic isolation, a method
to reduce the latency incurred by partitioning, also can
be used to protect against DoS and bandwidth attacks
because of the static time allocation to different domains
[24, 25].
2.2. HT-enabled DoS attacks on NoC
HT-assisted DoS attacks [26, 16, 27, 28, 29] can directly
target the NoC of a many-core chip, as malfunctioning
of NoC can cause the entire chip to be disconnected and
disintegrated, even though each single core might still be
fully functional. In [26], a bandwidth denial attack that
increases the network latency by rejecting the resource
request was described, and a detection method referred
as RLAN (Runtime Latency Auditor for NoCs) was sug-
gested. In a simple term, RLAN detects the HT when
network latency is found abnormal. In [27], a DoS attack
in wireless NoCs was launched by reducing normal nodes
bandwidth and thus causing widespread bandwidth loss.
The authors also proposed a DoS resilient wireless archi-
tecture to defend against such an attack, and they also
suggested countermeasures that can alleviate the effect of
the DoS attack with defense methods at both physical and
data routing levels. In [28], various flooding-based DoS
attacks were evaluated and the robustness of mesh-based
NoC architectures under these attacks was examined. In
[29], a target-activated sequential payload (TASP) HT in
support of a new type of DoS attack was proposed. To cir-
cumvent the threat of HTs, the author proposed a heuristic
threat detection model to classify faults and discover HTs
within compromised links.
2.3. Blackhole and sinkhole DoS attacks
Blackhole and sinkhole attacks are two of the most se-
vere attacks known for sensor networks [30, 31, 32, 33,
34, 35]. When a blackhole attack is launched, a malicious
node captures data from its neighboring nodes and stops
forwarding the data packets to their original destinations
[33]. Such a malicious node is called as blackhole node
and the region that encompasses such a node is known
as the region of blackhole. To identify and mitigate the
malicious nodes, in [33], route request packets are flooded
across the network to create a reliable path between the
source and the destination. In a sinkhole attack, the traffic
is directed to the hostile node and then many attacks like
selective and blackhole can be empowered by a sinkhole
attack [35]. A sinkhole attack is shown to be detectable
using the Delphi (Delay per Hop Indicator) technique as
proposed in [35].
Although there have a lot of studies on blackhole and
sinkhole attacks in the context of sensor networks, few
consider these attacks in NoC and the design of hardware
Trojans needed to launch and sustain such attacks. In [26],
a DoS attack targeting the NoC was envisioned, bearing a
great deal of similarity to such an attack ever seen in sensor
networks. As a matter fact, the attacks described in [26]
actually can be easily detected by comparing latencies of
similar packets.
In the next sections, we shall exploit how to ensure
the invisibility of the attack and assess attack effects. In
addition, we shall show that how to maximize the attack
effects by tuning a few critical parameters, such as number
and distribution of HTs, and a few more.
3. HT Designs for Sinkhole/Blackhole Attacks
In this section, we provide an HT design that enables
the sinkhole and blackhole DoS attacks. In Section 3.1, we
analyze the configuration that an HT needs and provide
details regarding the process of launching an attack. Sec-
tion 3.2 provides the detailed design of the HT module,
and the low degree of detectability of the designed HT is
shown in Section 3.3.
An HT can be inserted into the pipeline of a credit-
based virtual channel router [36], as shown in Fig. 3. An
HT has two parts: (1) the main part, named the main
HT, which is used to configure and perform the blackhole
3
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Figure 3: The hardware Trojan’s insertion in a credit-based virtual channel router
RC
dst
>en
head
0...000
VA
>
en
SU
0
1
0
1
>
SA
>
..
.
..
.
Input VC #i
data
read
ST
SU
CC
other VCs
other inputs
ready VC
credit
update
Input port
M
S
Output #j
Figure 4: The hardware Trojan’s insertion in a single-cycle VC-based
router at circuit level
attack, denoted as “M” in Fig. 3, and (2) the other part,
named sinkhole launcher, that is used to perform sinkhole
attack, denoted as “S” in Fig. 3. Each input port need an
HT, so there are totally five main HTs and five sinkhole
launchers, and each sinkhole launcher is synchronized with
its pairing main HT through a control signal. For more
details at circuit level, the HT’s insertion of one port in a
single-cycle VC-based router [37] is shown in Fig. 4.
Shown in Fig. 5, the HT includes a main HT and a
sinkhole launcher. The main HT consists of three mod-
ules, the trigger, the configuration, and the blackhole func-
tion modules. The sinkhole launcher only needs a sinkhole
function module. The specific design of hardware Trojan
is shown in Fig. 7. Both blackhole and sinkhole attacks
are supported by the proposed HT circuit. Based on the
trigger mode it adopts, the HT can operate on (a) always
on, (b) destination-triggered, or (c) command-triggered
modes. An always-on HT is active all the time, while a
destination-triggered HT is activated only when the des-
tination of a packet matches the victim ID configured by
the hacker. A command-triggered HT is activated by a
command generated by the hacker program.
The workflow of an HT is shown as in Fig. 6. Before a
 main HT
Trigger
Blackhole
configuration
HT structure
flits
flits
Sinkhole
credits
credits
SL
Figure 5: The structure of the proposed HT
hacker launches attack, it first sends a configuration packet
to the HT’s router and the HT’s configuration information
is then saved in a set of registers. Once configured, the
HTs can check what type of attack shall be launched, and
whether or not the attack shall be launched at the time
when they engage in packet transmissions.
3.1. Configuring the HT
Once the hacker wishes to launch an attack, he/she
activates the HTs for a short period of time by running a
program that manages to send the configuration packets.
The HTs can quickly return to be inactive to reduce the
chance to be detected.
First, the hacker needs to locate the malicious node in
order to send the configuration packets to its HTs. When
the cores communicate through Message Passing Interface
(MPI) [38], the hacker can easily gain a specific node’s ID.
Alternatively, the reverse engineering can be performed
to infer the ID of a network node by parsing the cache
address of the bank ID [39]. With knowledge of the node
ID, topology and routing, the hacker shall be able to locate
the HTs.
Second, a hacker or a malicious program can be sneak
in as a customer that has the privilege to run on a many-
core server compromised by HTs. In this case, the hacker
can send configuration packets by either MPI calls (speci-
fying the target node), or access a special memory address
4
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Figure 6: The workflow of the hardware Trojan’s configuration and
activation
(by reverse engineering [39], the address can be translated
to a cache bank ID, corresponding to the target node ID).
The malicious program can also multicast (making multi-
ple MPI calls or accessing memory addresses correspond-
ing to multiple cache banks) configuration packets to setup
the HTs.
A configuration packet has the following fields:
• Config cmd. Any packet that contains a bit pattern
of 00110101 in its cmd field is an HT configuration
packet.
• Trigger mode. The trigger mode field specifies the
method regarding how the HT is activated, and there
are three trigger modes: always-on, command-triggered,
and destination-triggered.
• Attack mode. The attack mode field defines the at-
tack type the HT shall launch; in this study, three
attack types are supported, namely the blackhole at-
tack, sinkhole attack, or both.
• Activation signal (flag). When this field is asserted,
the HT is activated. Otherwise, the HT is supposed
to be inactive.
• Victim ID. The victim ID specifies the packet desti-
nation address that shall trigger the HT, when HT
is in the destination-triggered mode.
=
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... ...
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=
cmd
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Trigger 
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Figure 7: The specific design of a hardware Trojan
• Interceptor ID. When the HT launches the blackhole
attack, every data packet passing through the HT
will be diverted to the malicious node that has an
address specified in this field.
Each HT in malicious routers has a set of registers cor-
responding to the above packet fields. At any malicious
router in the NoC, all the incoming data packets will be
scanned. If a packet is determined as a Config cmd packet,
the configuration registers in the HT are updated based on
the payload of the Config cmd packet received.
3.2. Launching the attack
Table 1: The optional modes and their relevant parameters
Operation options Relevant parameters
Trigger
mode
Always on Null
Destination Packet’s destination and
victim ID
Command Activation signal
Attack
mode
Blackhole Packet’s destination and
interceptor ID
Sinkhole Router’s credit
Once an HT has been configured, it can be activated by
the trigger module according to its triggering mode. The
operational modes and their relevant settings are shown in
Table 1. Once the HT is activated, the function module
is responsible for sustaining the blackhole attack, sinkhole
attack or both. In a blackhole attack, the destination of
the packet is replaced with the address of a preset mali-
cious node or an invalid address. In a sinkhole attack, the
5
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routing resource (e.g., free buffer slot number in the input
ports) is modified to claim a higher value. By doing so,
the malicious router can attract the data packets from its
neighboring routers to be routed to itself.
The procedure of launching the attack in the HT is as
follows:
step 1: The hacker sends a configuration packet to a ma-
licious node.
step 2: The HT in the malicious node receives the config-
uration packet and updates its configuration infor-
mation, after which the HT starts operating.
step 3: The trigger module of the HT selects its trigger
mode based on the data stored in the trigger mode
register.
step 4: The activated signal is generated from the trigger
module according to the select trigger modes: (a)
for the always on mode, the activated signal is as-
serted all the time; (b) for the command-triggered
mode, the activated signal is set to true when the
activation signal register holds the activation sig-
nal; and (c) for the destination-triggered mode, the
activated signal is set to be true when the destina-
tion field of each packet matches that saved in the
victim ID register.
step 5: Once the activated signal is found to be true, the
function module of the HT starts to launch the
attack.
step 6: Function module of the HT selects its attack mode
(blackhole or sinkhole attacks, or both) from the
attack mode register: (a) for the blackhole mode,
the interceptor’s ID replaces the original destina-
tion’s address as the output; and (b) for the sink-
hole mode, instead of using the true credit, the
output is falsely given a higher value.
3.3. Stealthiness analysis
The proposed HT is quite hard to be detected due to
two reasons:
First, the HT has a low silicon footprint and consumes
low energy to operate. The blackhole and sinkhole at-
tacks can be launched by the same HT circuit. Imple-
mented using a 45nm TSMC technology, every single HT
has an area of 17.46µm2, and consumes just 2.21µW power
(from the synthesis result generated by the Synopsys De-
sign CompilerTM ). That is, all the five HTs in one router
actually adds an area of 87.30µm2 and consumes addi-
tional 11.05µW of power. For comparison, a router of
modest size with four VCs and 4-flit depth FIFO has a to-
tal area of 130538µm2 and consumes 56mW power. One
can see that the HTs’ power and area overheads are ex-
tremely low, only 0.07% and 0.02% of an NoC router,
respectively. As far as the delay is concerned, the HT-
inserted router circuit sees a delay increase of less than
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Figure 8: The impact of average distance of HTs to the reference
edge on the blackhole attack effect, measured as packet loss rate.
0.06ns, which is 6% of a single-cycle router running at a
frequency of 1GHz. The offline testing methods or side
channel fingerprint method [40] for NoC may find it ex-
tremely difficult to detect a HT of such a small size.
Second, the HT is conditionally triggered. On the one
hand, the HT is controlled by the hacker program. With-
out explicit knowledge of the format of the configuration
packet, it is hard to activate and detect the HT. Further-
more, the HT is triggered only when the destination of the
packet is the victim and the activation signal is asserted,
which makes the similar package detection method or sim-
ilar destination detection method [26] simply not work.
4. Evaluation of the DoS Attack Effects
In this section, the attack effects of the proposed DoS
attacks are evaluated. We measure the attack effect through
packet loss rate, defined as the ratio of the number of
packets that cannot reach their destinations over the to-
tal number of packets transmitted. Attack effects due to
HT distribution, and application traffic characteristics are
determined in this section as well.
4.1. Factors relevant to the effects of DoS attacks
In this section, we evaluate the attack effects against
different parameters and determine the conditions that can
maximize the attack effects. Fig. 8 shows how effects of
blackhole attack vary with the distribution of HTs, which
is measured by the average distance of HTs to the reference
edge (selected to be the chip bottom edge in this paper)
and the average pairwise distance of the HTs in a 9 ×
9 mesh NoC. One can see when the average distance of
HTs to the reference edge is 4, the attack effect reaches
its peak. Generally speaking, we use two measures, the
average distance of HTs to the reference edge (x3) and the
average pairwise distance of the HTs (x4), to characterize
the HT distribution. Besides the distribution of the HTs,
attack effects of the DoS are found to be also related to
the following parameters.
• Number of HTs (x1).
• Average path length of the packets (x2). This is the
number of routers in the path from a given source to
a destination.
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• Number of victims (x5).
• Victim distribution. We use two variables, the aver-
age distance of victims to the reference edge (x6) and
the average pairwise distance of the victims (x7), to
characterize the victim distribution.
• Number of packets (x8). Number of packet is the
total number of packets that are injected into the
network in a cycle.
• Number of hotspots (x9). In the NoC, some nodes
that experience much more traffic than other nodes
are referred as hotspots. In this work, a node re-
ceives more than 30% packets per cycle on average
is defined to be a hotspot.
• Hotspot distribution. We use two variables, the aver-
age distance of hotspots to the reference edge (x10)
and the average pairwise distance of the hotspots
(x11), to characterize the hotspot distribution.
Among all the measures and parameters listed above, x1,
x3, x4, x5, x6, x7 are the ones that can be set by the
attacker, while all the others are considered as the system
parameters of the NoC, and they are out of the attacker’s
reach. In addition, parameters x1, x2, x3, x4 are found to
have higher impact than the others in defining the attack
effectiveness.
4.2. Modeling the attack effects
The blackhole and sinkhole attacks have significant im-
plications on system performance in terms of network la-
tency, packet loss, and power consumption. As the direct
result of an attack is to stop the flow of data packets, the
attack effect is directly measured by packet loss rate, y,
y =
n
N
(1)
where n is the number of lost packets caused by the at-
tacks, and N is the total number of packets in NoC.
The relationship between the packet loss rate and the
input parameters can be modeled as follows,
y =
11∑
i=1
p∑
j=0
aij × xji (2)
where aij ’s are the regression coefficients of the polynomial
regression model of p-th order, which can be computed by
the maximum likelihood method [41].
4.3. Maximizing the attack effects
Following the attack effect model described above, hack-
ers can maximize the attack effects by solving an optimiza-
tion problem with an upper limit set by the number of
HTs. This problem is formally described as follows:
Given a total of N HTs, find the best HT distribution
to maximize the attack effect modeled in Eq. 2. That is,
max y (3)
subject to
x1 ≤ N (4)
where N is the upper limit of HT number.
This problem can be solved through an exhaustive search
of the values of x1, x3, x4 to find the best value for y.
4.4. HT insertion methodology
A malicious agent can try to maximize the attack effect
by solving Eqs. 3 and 4. After the best HT distribution is
found, the malicious agent may manage to insert the HTs
as so determined to the SoC chip before it gets manufac-
tured.
The HT insertion methodology mainly considers two
distinct cases: (a) known traffic pattern, and (b) unknown
traffic pattern.
• Known traffic pattern. If the malicious agent knows
the traffic pattern and the hotspots’ locations (for
example, from profiling or logging of previous ver-
sions of chips), he/she first inserts a subset of HTs
close to these hotspots. Then the remaining HTs
will be modified so that the HTs’ locations match the
best HT distribution. For example, Fig. 9(a) shows a
5×5 mesh NoC whose traffic pattern is known and it
has three hotspots. Assume the malicious agent can
insert at most five HTs into the NoC and we have
the freedom to select their locations. First we cal-
culate the best HT distribution with x3 = 1.8 and
x4 = 2.2. Next we place the three HTs in the lo-
cations of the hotspots and the remaining HTs far
from the hotspots as shown in Fig. 9(a), which sat-
isfies the exact values of x3 and x4 as specified. By
setting these parameters, its is guaranteed that the
attack effect is maximized.
• Unknown traffic pattern. If the malicious agent doesn’t
have a priori knowledge of the traffic pattern, we will
have to assume a uniform distribution for the traffic.
Correspondingly, the number of hotspots is set to
be zero. In this case, the HTs are uniformly placed
across the chip. For example, Fig. 9(b) shows the
same NoC as Fig. 9(a), but in this case, the malicious
agent doesn’t know the traffic pattern. The best HT
distribution is found to be x3 = 2 and x4 = 2. As a
result, the malicious agent would place the five HTs
uniformly, as shown in Fig. 9(b).
5. Detection and Defense
5.1. The detection method
To detect the HTs, the global manager injects special
detection request packets into the network nodes period-
ically. The detection method is shown as Fig. 10. The
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Figure 10: The workflow of the detection method
global manager G first randomly selects a node, and then
sends detection request packets to it. If this node replies
to G within a given time, all the nodes on the path are
believed to be HT-free. Otherwise, if the reply time of
this select node exceeds a threshold, or there is no reply
from the node at all, the nodes on the path from the node
to G are further checked to find the exact location of the
HT-infected router. This simple method can only detect
the HTs with always on triggered mode, but it will fail
to detect conditionally triggered HTs. The HTs are only
active for a certain amount of time, typically short, and
when the HTs are inactive, the global manager will not be
able to find any anomalies, and this detect method fails to
find the HTs.
5.2. The defense method
Once the HT routers have been detected, a detour rout-
ing method can be applied, where packets will be routed
along the paths that do not include the routers infected
with HTs. In this case, each router needs to keep a local
record of all its neighboring nodes regarding whether they
are legitimate or malicious. Once a malicious node is de-
tected, the global manager G broadcasts this information
to all the clean routers, the ones that are not infected by
HTs. At the same time, the routers whose downstream
node is identified as a malicious one save the locations of
the malicious nodes into their own local storage. Once a
packet is to be forwarded by a router, this router will have
to look at its record to see if the downstream router is a
malicious one or not. If not, the packet will be routed as
it should be. Otherwise, it finds another output channel
and checks again. The west-first turn model [42] can be
applied to avoid any routing deadlock.
6. Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we first run experiments to (i) deter-
mine the appropriate regression model presented at Sec-
tion 4.2 for the attack effects, (ii) determine the parame-
ters that impact the effectiveness of attacks, (iii) evaluate
the attack effects and (iv) evaluate the defense methods.
6.1. Experimental setup
Experiments are performed using POPNET, an event-
driven NoC simulator. Table 2 shows the specific simulator
configuration. In the follow experiments, we select a 9× 9
8
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Table 2: Configuration used in the simulation
NoC size 9× 9
Number of routers 81
NoC flit size 72-bit
NoC latency router 1 cycle, link 1 cycle
NoC input buffer
depth
4
NoC VC number 4
Routing algorithm XY routing, adaptive rout-
ing, west-first turn based by-
pass routing
linear quadratic cubic quartic
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
e
rr
o
r
Errors of attack effect estimation model
Figure 11: Errors of the attack effect estimation models
2D mesh as the underline NoC topology with a total of 81
routers.
In particular, the simulations with different network
sizes, 8 × 8, 9 × 9, 16 × 16, are also performed, and their
results are very similar to what is obtained in a network
of smaller size, in terms of attack model, attack effects,
and defense effects. Here we pick a median-sized network
(of size 9× 9) to demonstrate the results. We adopt three
routing algorithms in our experiments. XY routing is em-
ployed when we evaluate the effects of blackhole attack in
Sections 6.3 and 6.4, while adaptive routing is used to eval-
uate the effects of sinkhole attacks. When we evaluate the
defense effect of the proposed defense method in Section
6.5, bypass routing based on west-first turn is employed.
6.2. Evaluation of the errors of the model
We compare the errors of the polynomial regression
models with different orders in Eq. 2. The error of the
model is defined as,
εa =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣yi − yˆiyi
∣∣∣∣ (5)
where m is number of experiments, yi and yˆi are the packet
loss rates obtained from the simulation and calculated by
the model in Eq. 2, respectively. From Fig. 11, one can see
that the quadratic regression model gives the lowest level
of error, and its correlation coefficient is about 0.86. In
the following, we will use this quadratic regression model
for the estimation of attack effects.
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
number of HTs
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
pa
ck
et
 lo
ss
 ra
te
Blackhole
Sinkhole
Figure 12: The number of HTs vs. packet loss rate for blackhole and
sinkhole attacks
6.3. Analysis of the factors impacting attack effects
6.3.1. Number of HTs
In this set of experiments, we set the average distance
of HTs to reference edge (x3) to be 3, the average pairwise
distance of HTs (x4) to be 2, and x2 to be 6. Fig. 12
shows the relationship between the number of HTs (x1)
and the packet loss rate for blackhole and sinhole attacks.
For blackhole attack, one can see from Fig. 12 that when
the number of HTs is less than 16, the packet loss rate
increases rapidly with the increase of the number of HTs.
When the number of HTs is over 16, the increase of packet
loss rate slows down significantly and gradually approaches
to 1. When the number of HTs reaches 81, i.e., all the
81 router nodes have their own HT, the packet loss rate
reaches 100% as predicted. The sinkhole attack performs
the similar result as blackhole attack and it’s attack effect
is better.
6.3.2. HT distribution
We set x1 to be 5, x2 to be 6, and x4 to be 2. Fig. 13
shows the relationship between the average distance of
HTs (with respect to the reference edge (x3)) and the
packet loss rate. When x3 is less than 4, the packet loss
rate increases with the increase of x3, and reaches the peak
when x3 is equal to 4. When x3 is greater than 4, the
packet loss rate starts to decrease. The reason is that
when x3 is very small (e.g., 1 or 2) or very large, (e.g., 7
or 8), HTs are placed close to the edges of network; when
x3 is around 4, HTs are near the center of network. As
the network traffic shows a uniform traffic pattern, the
traffic volume around the center nodes are higher than
that of nodes far from the center. As a result, the HTs
located at or near the center nodes tend to cause more se-
vere damages to the system. The sinkhole attack performs
the similar result as blackhole attack and it’s attack effect
is better.
Next we set x3 to be 3 and vary x4. Fig. 14 shows the
relationship between the average pairwise distance of HTs
(x4) and the packet loss rate. One can see that when x4
is less than 3, the packet loss rate increases gradually and
reaches the peak when x4 = 3; when x4 is greater than
9
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Figure 13: The average distance of HT to the reference edge vs.
packet loss rate for blackhole and sinkhole attacks
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Figure 14: The average pairwise distance of HTs vs. packet loss rate
for blackhole and sinkhole attacks
3, the packet loss rate declines. The reason is that when
x4 is small, the HTs are in close proximity. When HTs
are scattered and are far away from each other, they may
be close to the chip corners. In both cases, fewer pack-
ets travel through the HTs, and thus, fewer packets get
dropped from the system. The sinkhole attack performs
the similar result as blackhole attack and it’s attack effect
is better.
6.3.3. Path length of the packets
In this set of experiments, we set x1 to be 5, x3 to be
3, and x4 to be 2. Fig. 15 shows the relationship between
the average path length of packets (x2) and the packet
loss rate. From the Fig. 15, as the average path length
increases, the packet loss rate increases in a nearly linear
fashion. The reason is that, when the path length is long,
there is a high probability that a packet may pass through
a node infected with HT. The sinkhole attack performs the
similar result as blackhole attack and it’s attack effect is
better.
6.4. Evaluating the attack effects after optimization
We compare the attack effects of the optimized HT
distribution by solving the optimization problem in Eqs. 3
and 4 (e.g., with optimization) and that of a random HT
distribution (i.e., without optimization). In this set of ex-
periments, the number of HTs varies from 1 to 6. The
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Figure 15: The average path length of packets vs. packet loss rate
for blackhole and sinkhole attacks
average path length of the packet is set to be 2, 4, 8, re-
spectively. Fig. 16(a)-(c) show the blackhole attack effects
with and without optimization. The results are normalized
to the case that the optimization is applied. One can see
that the optimized HT distribution improves the attack
effect by 30% compared to a random HT distribution, on
average. From Fig. 16(a), when the average path length
is 2 and the number of HTs is 1, the packet loss rate of
the optimized HT distribution is 24% higher than that of
the random HT distribution. From Fig. 16(c), when the
average path length is 8 and the number of HTs is 3, the
packet loss rate of the optimized HT distribution is 36%
higher than that of the random HT distribution.
Fig. 17(a)-(c) compare the sinkhole attack effect with
and without optimization. One can see that the optimized
HT distribution improves the attack effect by 34% com-
pared to the random HT distribution, on average. From
Fig. 17(a), when the average path length is 2 and the num-
ber of HTs is 4, the packet loss rate of the optimized HT
distribution is 25% higher than that of the random HT dis-
tribution. From Fig. 17(c), when the average path length
is 8 and the number of HTs is 1, the packet loss rate of
the optimized HT distribution is 41% higher than that of
the random HT distribution.
6.5. Evaluating the defense methods
In this set of experiments, the number of chosen sus-
pects varies from 2 to 10. The results are normalized to
that of the case without applying any defense. Fig. 18(a)
shows the packet loss rate caused by blackhole attack with-
out and with defense measures deployed. One can see
that packet loss rate in a system with defense employed
is reduced by 42% on average. Even with more nodes be-
ing selected as the suspects and checked, the packet loss
rate is still quite high, at 52% of the original. This is be-
cause when the HT changes its attack target, the detection
method is no longer considered effective.
Fig. 18(b) shows the packet loss rates caused by sink-
hole attack in both cases without and with defense. One
can see that the packet loss rate of the case that employs
defense is reduced by 39% on average. Even with more
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Figure 16: The packet loss rate comparison between the optimal HT distribution and random HT distribution for blackhole attack when
average packet path length is (a) 2, (b) 4, (c) 8.
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Figure 17: The packet loss rate comparison between the optimal HT distribution and random HT distribution for sinkhole attack when
average packet path length is (a) 2, (b) 4, (c) 8.
nodes being selected as the suspects, the packet loss rate
remains high, at 57% of the original. In a simple word, the
effectiveness of the current detection and defense against
the enhanced blackhole and sinkhole attacks, as described
in Section 5, tends to be quite limited.
As alluded before, the configuration module can help
change the trigger conditions. When the attack target and
attack interval are changed, the detection method makes
little effect because they fail to trigger the HTs.
7. Conclusion
Blackhole/sinkhole DoS attacks targeting the NoC sys-
tems of many-core chips can cause severe packet losses
and/or divert traffic to malicious nodes other than their
intended designations. In this paper, the effects of the
attacks as measured by packet loss rate, were quantita-
tively modeled by considering several critical parameters,
including number of HTs and their distribution in NoC.
Through fine-tuning of these parameters, both attacks are
shown to cause more damages to NoC, with the packet
loss rate jumped by more than 30%. Even with detec-
tion and defense methods in place, the packet loss rate
can still reach 52%. This research indicates a strong need
to develop more effective countermeasures to thwart these
enhanced attacks.
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